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Welcome to the New Originalism:
A Comment on Jack Balkin’s
Living Originalism
Randy E Barnett*
I am delighted to contribute to this symposium on what is sure to become a staple
of constitutional scholarship, Jack Balkin’s recent bookLiving Originalism.1 I stand
by my comments on the book jacket: ‘‘Living Originalism is the best and most
important work in constitutional theory since Dworkin’s Law’s Empire.2 Despite
my deep disagreement with several of its key claims, it is without doubt a work of
remarkable sophistication, maturity and grace. Jack Balkin is already in the upper
echelon of today’s constitutional scholars, but this book puts him at the top of the
top.’’ The most newsworthy thing about the book’s publication is simply that Jack
Balkin has adopted originalism as his own.
This is not to deny that I have deep disagreements with portions of the book.
Indeed, I have written separately and more in depth about our differing views on
the commerce clause3 and underlying principles.4 In this essay, I will focus on
Balkin’s nuanced approach to interpretation that marks his great contribution to
constitutional theory. To appreciate his position, I will discuss how and why a
nonoriginalist can become an originalist. I, for one, was not an originalist until
the end of the last century. By discussing how I eventually became one, I hope to
shed some light on what exactly is so remarkable about Jack Balkin’s move.
The three main problems with originalism: intentions,
indeterminacy, and legitimacy
Having been a student of Ronald Dworkin and finding his approach in Law’s
Empire very appealing, as a young law professor I would have described myself
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law Center. Email: rbarnett@gmail.
com. This article is based on remarks given at the ‘‘Symposium on Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism,’’ held at
Hebrew University on 18 May 2012. My thanks to Alisa Melekhina for her invaluable assistance on this essay.
1 JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).
2 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
3 It is difficult to discuss our disagreement on the commerce clause here because if you are an originalist,
these are disagreements that are handled by appealing to evidence. To be convincing, a more comprehensive
presentation of evidence is required than is possible in this brief comment. See Randy E. Barnett, Jack Balkin’s
Interaction Theory of ‘‘Commerce’’, 2012 U. Ill. L. REV. 623 (2011).
4 See Randy E. Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24 CONST. COMMENT 405 (2007).
 The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions,
please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
 
 
as a ‘‘Dworkinian.’’ My three principal dissatisfactions with originalism, which
still persist today, were with intentions, indeterminacy, and legitimacy.
When originalism began to be identified as a discernible theory of interpret-
ation, it was formulated in terms of trying to respect the intentions of the framers
of the Constitution. This is now known as original intent originalism. The prob-
lem with using intentions was laid bare by Paul Brest in his influential 1980 article
criticizing originalism.5 He recognized that since intentions exist in people’s
minds, it is difficult to discern what those intentions are. But it is especially
problematic to hypothesize a ‘‘collective intent’’ of multiple minds. This deep
incoherence was certainly troubling to me and I accepted it as a valid criticism.
Instead of finding evidence as to what the framers intended on a particular
matter, an old originalist would have to ‘‘channel’’ them. Take, for example,
whether the thermal imaging of a house, to determine whether the occupants
are growing marijuana in the basement, is a search for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment. The framers would obviously have been unaware of this modern
technology. So originalists would typically have to channel the framers by asking
the counterfactual question, ‘‘Oh framers, what would you think about the thermal
imaging of a house?’’ Because this is not a factual question, the framers’ intentions
would be discerned by employing a counterfactual thought experiment, rather
than engaging in a historical investigation based on evidence.
The second related criticism of indeterminacy potentially applies as well to
other versions of originalism. It presents the challenge that Constitution’s
meaning is not specific enough, and does not convey enough information to
bind judges and decision-makers. I will return to this momentarily.
Additionally, the third well-known problem of originalism, the issue of legit-
imacy, seemed to me telling. Why we should care and furthermore be authori-
tatively bound by the intentions of those long-dead ancestors or, in my case,
someone else’s long-dead ancestors? This problem led me to pejoratively char-
acterize this version of originalism as the ‘‘framers as wardens’’ approach.6 To
old originalists, the framers were somehow authoritative wardens, similar to
how prisoners must obey their prison wardens.
My path from nonoriginalism to originalism
Notwithstanding these pressing problems, I came to be an originalist in an
unusual way. I did not get to it because of a theoretical discovery or because
I read some contemporary scholarship on the subject. Instead, while teaching a
seminar on constitutional theory, I happened to come across the writings of a
5 Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980). Indeed, in
this article, Brest first coined the term ‘‘originalism.’’
6 See Randy E. Barnett, The Relevance of the Framers’ Intent, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403 (1995) (‘‘I shall
discuss two reasons to consult the Framers. The first views the Framers as wardens; the second as designers or
architects.’’).
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19th century abolitionist legal theorist named Lysander Spooner, whose ap-
proach to interpretation had been remarkably influential among abolitionist
constitutional theorists prior to the Civil War.
In 1845 Spooner published The Unconstitutionality of Slavery7 long before the
Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery. He argued that the Constitution did
not actually protect slavery, but was in fact anti-slavery. This struck me as quite
counterintuitive to say the least. He reached this conclusion by using a version
of originalism that was unfamiliar to me.
Garrisonian critics of the Constitution who had argued that the Constitution
was pro-slavery based their argument on the pro-slavery intentions of the fra-
mers of the Constitution.8 So too did Chief Justice Taney use intentionalism in
Dred Scott.9 In contrast, Spooner employed what has now come to be called
original public meaning originalism. According to Spooner, the Constitution,
independently of the actual intentions of the people, expresses some certain fixed,
definite, and legal intentions; else the people themselves would express no intentions
by agreeing to it10 [. . .] The intentions of the framers of the constitution [. . .] have
nothing to do with fixing the legal meaning of the constitution. That convention were
not delegated to adopt or establish a constitution; but only to consult, devise and
recommend. The instrument, when it came from their hands, was a mere proposal,
having no legal force or authority. It finally derived all its validity and obligation, as a
frame of government, from its adoption by the people at large.11
My attraction to Spooner’s approach did not, and does not, depend on whether
his conclusion about the Constitution’s position on slavery was correct. What
attracted me was the promise of this version of originalism to respond to
deficiencies of the old originalism.12 And, unbeknownst to me, other original-
ists, such as Justice Antonin Scalia and political theories Keith Whittington,
were already moving in the direction toward this new originalism.
How the new originalism addresses the three problems
with the old originalism
The new originalism effectively responds to the difficulties of the old origi-
nalism. First, rather than resting on the framers’ intentions, new originalism
7 See LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY (rev. ed.1860), reprinted in 4 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF LYSANDER SPOONER (Charles Shively ed., 1971). For a discussion of the constitutional
abolitionist movement of which Spooner was a part, see Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section One? The
Abolitionist Origin of the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J. of Legal Analysis 165 (2011).
8 See eg WENDELL PHILLIPS, THE CONSTITUTION, A PRO-SLAVERY COMPACT (1845).
9 See Dred Scott v Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
10 SPOONER, supra note 7 at 222.
11 Id. at 114.
12 It is possible also to distinguish Spooner’s approach from the best modern version of original public
meaning originalism, for example, with regard to his stress on the ‘‘legal’’ meaning of the text. But that distinc-
tion, if warranted, was not apparent to me when I first read Spooner and was influenced by him to reconsider
originalism. See Randy E. Barnett, Was Slavery Unconstitutional Before the Thirteenth Amendment?, Lysander
Spooner’s Theory of Interpretation, 28 PAC. L.J. 977 (1997).
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is premised on determining the original public meaning of the text of the
Constitution. Putting this into more familiar contract law terms, the theory
relies on the Constitution’s objective public meaning rather than the subjective
intentions of the framers.13 The Constitution’s text is objective in that it is a
social construct that is independent of any particular person’s opinion or pref-
erences about the meaning of language. To communicate with others requires
us to learn a ‘‘common’’ language that is necessarily independent of our own
will and intentions. We must understand and make ourselves understood by
invoking this common language.
While language is thus a human artifact and does not exist independently of
human thought, it does exist independently of any one of our intentions about
it. Even though there is an expressed, implied, and contextual meaning, they
are all objective in the sense that they are independent of the internal mental
states of the people who invoke the social convention called language.
Language is not simply a social and rational enterprise—it is discernable. If
we can discern it today, we can discern it from yesterday. This ability renders
the new originalism far more practical than the old originalism with its search
for the collective intentions of the framers.
One would expect that, if the Constitution’s framers were being careful, their
subjective intentions would track the public meaning of the words they chose.
Hence, it is no accident that this objective meaning closely correlates with the
subjective intentions we are able to discern. By invoking this independently
existing meaning, the framers transformed whatever internal intentions they
harbored into an externally perceivable intention, or from their subjective in-
tentions to an objective semantic meaning.
Of course, it is possible that the resulting objective meaning might conflict
with their subjective intentions. However, such divergence is unlikely to be
commonplace if the framers were careful. Spooner claimed that at least some
of the people who wrote the text did not want to write what they truly thought.
Because they knew that slavery is wrong, they deliberately employed euphem-
isms. A euphemism is a word or phrase with a good meaning that is used to
refer to something bad. What do we do when the authors of a constitution
write this way? Spooner contended that we are only bound by the ‘‘good’’ or
innocent meaning of the text, not by the intention.14
In addition to relying on original public meaning, the new originalism
addresses the problem of indeterminacy by distinguishing between the activity
13 I want to make it clear that as someone who takes contracts and contractual consent very seriously, I do not
think the Constitution qualifies as a contract. However, it is a writing and shares some attributes with written
contracts. Among these is that there is a semantic, objective public meaning of the text that is distinct from the
subjective intentions of the people who drafted the document. On this distinction, see RANDY E. BARNETT,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 14–25, 40–45 (2004).
14 I discuss the problem of intentional ambiguity created by euphemistic language in the context of slavery
and the Constitution, in Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional Assumptions, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 615, 633, 641, 648–50 (2009).
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of identifying the communicative meaning of the text and the activity of apply-
ing that meaning to particular factual situations. When the text does not con-
tain enough information to resolve a particular case or controversy, something
else must be done to supplement it. When the text of the Constitution does not
contain all the information required to render a decision, the new originalism
acknowledges the need for decision-makers to adopt other decision-making
rules, principles, or standards to put the information it does supply into effect.
Princeton professor Keith Whittington was the first of the new originalists to
differentiate between these two key activities that had previously been run to-
gether. He called the first activity of identifying the information conveyed by
the text ‘‘constitutional interpretation,’’ and the second activity of applying that
meaning to particular cases ‘‘constitutional construction.’’15 The distinction
between interpretation and construction was a traditional doctrine in
American legal practice. Though it was largely lost in the 20th century, it
features prominently in Living Originalism.
According to new originalists, originalism is a theory of constitutional inter-
pretation as opposed to construction. Whereas originalism used to claim to be
a closed enterprise that obtains results, the new originalism takes originalist
interpretation as far as it can go, and then recognizes that an element of
nonoriginalist construction is required to go farther. When the need to supple-
ment originalist interpretation with nonoriginalist construction is acknowl-
edged, originalism becomes much more open-ended enterprise than it was
previously claimed to be. This has created resistance from some originalists.16
The most significant contribution of the new originalism may be that it
addresses the crucial problem of legitimacy. Rather than dictating that the
American people must be bound by the intentions of their ancestors, the
new originalism views the Constitution as the law that governs those who
govern the American people. Because the people are a mass who do not
have a single mind or voice, a written constitution is the only authoritative
‘‘voice’’ of the people. Where it speaks, the servants of the people must
obey. Just as you or I cannot change the traffic laws that are imposed upon
us without going through the legislative process, the strategy of using a written
law to oversee those who govern us simply will not work if those who are to be
governed by this law can change its meaning without going through the amend-
ment process.
For this reason, the meaning of the written Constitution should remain the same
until it is properly changed, which is simply a short-hand way of describing
originalism. And the proper way of changing the American Constitution is
by constitutional amendment.
15 See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, &
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999).
16 See, eg, John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A NewTheory of
Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW U. L. REV. 751 (2009).
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The hallmark of the new originalism—and Balkin’s theory—is its presentist
commitment to the past. The Constitution is binding on government today
because we the people today are committed to what the Constitution refers
to as ‘‘this Constitution,’’ by which is meant the writing itself. The institutions
that are supposed to be governed by ‘‘this Constitution’’—the executive, judi-
cial, and legislative branches—cannot change its meaning unless they go
through the appropriate procedures.
If this sounds odd, it should not. After all, even living constitutionalists often
adhere to the original meaning of the judicial precedents they like. Yet there is
no apparent conundrum associated with today’s judges following faithfully the
writings of long dead judges. We may not agree with what the Constitution
says, any more than we may agree with what precedents may say. But there is
no mystery about why ‘‘following the law’’ is not a slavish commitment to the
past, but is rather a means of controlling the behavior of current actors who
wield considerable power. What is odd, and ultimately unpersuasive to the
general public today, is the proposition that those who are to be bound by
the Constitution may remake the rules whenever the constraints imposed upon
them become inconvenient to their objectives.
A cautionary note about underlying principles
In Living Originalism, Balkin offers a powerful defense of original meaning
originalism, which he says is consistent with at least some vision of living
constitutionalism. He identifies his approach as the method of ‘‘text and prin-
ciple.’’ This involves checking whether the text can ‘‘bear’’ a proposed consti-
tutional construction and still make sense within the larger Constitutional
scheme.17 However ingenious it may be to employ text and principle simul-
taneously in this manner, Balkin’s account can nevertheless be read as blurring
the useful line between interpretation and construction, and between the new
originalism and the more traditional version of living constitutionalism.
For example, there is a danger in slipping from applying text and principle to
applying text or principle instead. Balkin’s methodology as presented would
involve analyzing the text to check for plain meaning and turning to underlying
principles if the original meaning is not clear. On his account, the underlying
principle then becomes disembodied from the text and is applied generally,
while leaving the text it supposedly underlies behind. When this happens,
the method ceases to be originalism plus construction, and becomes all con-
struction. Indeed, this is the way most living constitutionalism has always been
practiced. Living originalists claim to be truer to the ‘‘principles’’ of the
Constitution than those who would blindly follow the text. The term ‘‘living
constitutionalism’’ was coined to justify ignoring or contradicting text in favor
17 Balkin, supra note 1 at 254.
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of more dominant contemporary principles that are said somehow to derive
from, or underlie, the text.
Closely related to this unrefined ‘‘text or principle’’ methodology is the
notion that constitutional meaning is more of a continuum of rules on one
end and open-ended standards on the other. In crucial places, Balkin turns the
text into a more of a standard than the evidence of textual meaning would
support. So, for example, although some a principle of ‘‘equality’’ may well
underlie the clause protecting the ‘‘equal protection of the law,’’ the words
‘‘protection’’ and ‘‘of the law’’ have a narrowing meaning that quickly gets
jettisoned. Done properly, any resort to underlying principles must then ree-
merge through the text for it to be the text, rather than the disembodied
principle, to provide the law of case.
I hasten to add that I do not think that Balkin is insincere in the methodo-
logical section of the book. But when executing the methodology, his old living
constitutional self resurfaces. Though it is not irremediable, this looseness of
his approach to constitutional construction may regrettably shift the focus from
Balkin’ momentous methodological breakthrough in uniting two opposing
camps of constitutional scholarship. Instead, he leaves himself vulnerable to
charges of opportunism. Both his critics on his left and on his right may
charge that his supposed adoption of originalism is a feint. He only adopts
originalist rhetoric because his ‘‘text and principle’’ approach to construction
gets him everywhere he wants to go.
Conclusion
Balkin’s Living Originalism is a major contribution to the debate over the
proper method of constitutional interpretation. Whatever else one might
think of his particular arguments, Balkin’s conscious and deliberate adoption
of ‘‘originalism’’ is a major cultural development in the legal academy. It will
now be harder for die-hards to dismiss originalism as naı¨ve, ignorant, or evil.
No legal academic I know is more savvy, knowledgeable, or decent than Jack
Balkin. I welcome him to the growing club of new originalists. Secret hand-
shake to follow.
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